JEAN VAN HEIJENOORT, THE REVOLUTIONARY, THE SCHOLAR, AND MAN (1912—1986)[1]

Jean Louis van Heijenoort was born in Creil, France, a suburb of Paris, on July 23, 1912. As a student at the Lycée St. Louis in Paris, he came to hate the oppressive French educational system of the day, and he became an opponent of the society. He was drawn intellectually and emotionally towards the Soviet experiment, taught himself Russian at age seventeen, and joined the French Communist Party. His Trotskyite tendencies were strengthened after he was injured in a brawl between supporters of Trotsky and supporters of Stalin.[2] In 1932, at age twenty and a student at the University of Paris, van Heijenoort responded to a call from the Trotskyite party for someone with a knowledge of French and Russian who could assist Trotsky with his correspondence. On October 13, 1932, van Heijenoort sailed from Marseilles to the Turkish island of Prinkipo, where Trotsky was living in exile. He arrived there on October 20 and was greeted warmly by Trotsky and his entourage. Thus began a turbulent, adventurous career of seven years in which van Heijenoort became a member of the Trotsky household, serving as Trotsky's secretary, interpreter, companion, general factotum, and bodyguard. Within the Trotsky circle, he came to be called familiarly "Van". Van Heijenoort followed Trotsky from Turkey to France, Norway, and, finally, to Mexico. The experiences of these years is recounted in van Heijenoort's memoir, *With Trotsky in Exile.*

Van Heijenoort's memoir was intended to reveal to the scholarly world those facts concerning Trotsky's years in exile which only an insider, one who was present, could know. In an appendix to his memoir, van Heijenoort undertook a 'Correction of Errors in Writings on Trotsky'.[3] In the 'Foreword' to the book, van Heijenoort warns that the book is "not a political history", but a recollection "which attempts to recreate the atmosphere in which Trotsky lived and worked during his years in exile".[4] In my review of *With Trotsky in Exile*, I also made it clear that the book is not a philosophical examination of Trotsky's political philosophy or of the great Trotsky-Stalin schism.[5] I did,

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nevertheless, attempt to examine, by way of background, what I felt were the historical roots of the Trotsky-Stalin feud; this naturally raised issues of a psychological dimension concerning the principals in the feud, as well as strictly political, historical, philosophical, and ideological issues, some of them touching raw nerves, reopening old battle scars.[6]

The episode connected with my review of *With Trotsky in Exile* reveals much about van Heijenoort's personality as well as something of van Heijenoort's views of Russian Communism, and his notions of scholarship. It is worth recounting. But before we discuss the personal and ideological aspects of van Heijenoort's Trotskyism and the circumstances of the ideological conflict between van Heijenoort and myself and the personal break between us created by my review of *Exile*, we shall require more details of van Heijenoort's life and work to provide the necessary background.

From van Heijenoort's memoirs, we get a picture of Trotsky as a sarcastic, sardonic person, one who could not forget his years in the highest echelons of Soviet power. Trotsky seemed to have remained something of an autocratic warlord, even in exile. From van Heijenoort's memoirs, one comes away with a picture of the arrogant, calculating, domineering know-it-all, although this is very far from the picture that van Heijenoort meant to draw; all the more reason to suppose it to be accurate. Van Heijenoort spoke of Trotsky elsewhere as "a fighter whose adversities only served to renew his strength", one who "did not moan" but continued fighting; who was "of great physical and emotional strength".[7] Intellectually, Trotsky was remembered by van Heijenoort as being "bright ... a man with a great gift for words and ideas".[8] Regrettably, this is not the picture that comes through in *Exile*.

In my review of *Exile*, I expressed some disappointment that van Heijenoort did not see fit to discuss in detail Trotsky's philosophical views, in particular since there must have been innumerable philosophical discussions between the two men.[9] And indeed, Trotsky devoted some attention from 1933 to 1935 to a study of Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Logik*, while writing that his "philosophical interests have been growing", but his "knowledge is too insufficient". He also wrote at that time on the nature of dialectics — admittedly in the context of his preparatory work on a planned but never-executed study of Lenin. And

it is true that much of his time during this period, as van Heijenoort tells us, was devoted primarily to the political disputes within the French Communist Party and to his own polemical struggles against Stalinism.[10] Van Heijenoort did, however, record some anecdotes which reflect Trotsky's attitudes towards dialectical materialism. I refer, for example, to the occasion on which Trotsky declared that, since van Heijenoort was tall and blond and van Heijenoort's mistress short and dark-haired, that the twins born of their relationship provided evidence that "the mixture of races is always very fertile".[11] I ventured the opinion that this remark was rooted in a Lysenkoist tinge to Trotsky's social anthropology. In fact, Trotsky's views of Darwinism were quite compatible with Lysenkoist theories. Lysenko argued that quantitative biological changes determined by environment or physiology could be permanently inherited by succeeding generations taking revolutionary biological leaps. Likewise, Trotsky interpreted Darwinian theory dialectically: according to his interpretation, gradual quantitative biological evolution could take a sudden leap as a revolutionary change in quality.[12] It also reflected, I hinted, something of Trotsky's rather didactic, self-confident, intellectual arrogance. There was, likewise, much the same sort of doctrinaire preaching attendant in the recollection of Trotsky's example of a mother's slap of her child as an instance of the "dialectic of love and hatred", and of Trotsky's own visit to the dentist evincing the hope that "a synthetic mode of treating a tooth would be found".[13]

As I noted, these anecdotes show something of "Trotsky's talent for finding dialectics at work in ordinary life situations".[14] I nevertheless could not dispel the underlying impression that these examples reveal Trotsky's peremptory intellectual arrogance and the suffuse feeling that they likewise reflect Trotsky's sense of having a monopoly on the true interpretation of dialectical materialism and on orthodox Marxist philosophy. In response to these reflections in the first draft of my review (a copy of which was sent to van Heijenoort before copies of the final version were sent to *Studies in Soviet Thought*), van Heijenoort wrote:[15]

The question of Trotsky and dialectics is, of course, a large question. He has written on the topic. These texts are fairly well known and, of course, deserve discussion. The two

small stories out of daily life that I tell in my book are simply intended to show that, for him, dialectics was a living philosophy which he took seriously in every sphere of life.

This remark would not have been out of place in *Exile*. Van Heijenoort's point could and should have been made much more explicitly in the memoir, the stories used as illustrations rather than as flat anecdotes. That might have softened, if not eliminated, the temptation to view the anecdotes as examples of Trotsky's intellectual bombast.[16] For as van Heijenoort had written elsewhere, "Trotsky applied the same scientific conscientiousness in all that he did."[17]

It must also be said here, that, whatever one's estimation may be of Trotsky's interpretation of Marxist philosophy, van Heijenoort is plainly on slippery ground indeed when he declares that dialectics was, for Trotsky, a living *philosophy*. Writing on dialectics during the most mature phase of his intellectual development, at a time when van Heijenoort would have known him best, Trotsky clearly stated, without qualification, that "dialectics is the logic of development", the most general of scientific tools, and that philosophy was the methodological science, or "toolmaking guild", for the particular sciences.[18] Trotsky did not, then, conflate the tool of dialectics with the toolmaking philosophy, as van Heijenoort's expression suggests that he did. A more careful analysis of dialectics would show two distinct levels of dialectics: on the material level, dialectics is the active process of development in nature, in material reality; on the methodological level, dialectics is the explanatory-descriptive tool for analyzing material processes. In neither case could dialectics be (easily) conflated with philosophy as the most general science of the sciences, which employs dialectics as its methodology.

In October of 1939, van Heijenoort, who had by then been with Trotsky for seven years without rest and had never left Trotsky's side for more than a few very brief periods, began planning a working vacation. He was asked by Trotsky to study the political situation within the ranks of the American Trotskyite party.[19] Van Heijenoort left Trotsky's Mexican villa at Coyoacan on November 5, 1939, and set sail for New York City; he saw Trotsky for the last time the previous evening. As planned, van Heijenoort spent several months in New York, as Trotsky's personal emissary to the Trotskyite groups in the

United States. Soon thereafter, he found himself in Baltimore, teaching French. On August 21, 1940, he read in the *New York Times* of the attempt on Trotsky's life. He hurried to his apartment to await news, listening anxiously and in a state of shock to his radio, as word came confirming the death of Trotsky.

With the death of Trotsky came new worries. What was to become of Trotsky's correspondence? There had been concern, expressed by Trotsky himself, that his papers could, upon his death, fall into the wrong hands, to become a political weapon — or worse — in the hands of either the Stalinists or the Nazis. It was decided by Trotsky and his wife Natalia that the papers be deposited in a safe haven. Trotsky had at one time predicted that a war would break out between Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany. He had even gone so far as to predict that Germany would win that war, that Stalin had made so many internal enemies in the USSR that much of the population would support the Nazi invader. Trotsky had good cause to worry about the safety of his papers.[20] There was also the more pressing concern that either the Stalinists or the Hitlerites would fall into possession of his papers to use them to identify, locate, and liquidate Trotsky's supporters.

In 1940, van Heijenoort participated in negotiations with various institutions to locate a safe repository for Trotsky's papers. Trotsky offered his archives for sale to the New York Public Library, to Stanford University, and to Harvard University; but all were reluctant to accept the offer. At last, Harvard University purchased them for $8,500. They were delivered in two installments; the first, containing the papers written in the years from 1917 to 1937, arrived in the autumn of 1940 at Harvard's Widener Library. Van Heijenoort and the Harvard library staff began at once the arduous task of cataloguing, and later microfilming, the documents. The remainder of the papers, written from 1937 until Trotsky's death in 1940, were purchased from Trotsky's widow in 1946. In all, Harvard obtained some 17,500 documents, about 12,500 of which were written while Trotsky was in exile. From 1940 to 1980, van Heijenoort served as Special Bibliographer in the Trotsky archives at Harvard, working to organize the archive. It had been stipulated that the documents written during the period of Trotsky's exile (1924–1940) not be made public until 1980.[21] On Wednesday, January 1, 1980, the Trotsky Archives, with van Heijenoort

present and answering questions, was officially opened. On Monday, January 7, van Heijenoort spoke at a reception at the newly opened Archives, on 'The History of Trotsky's Papers'. He noted that "Trotsky had a sense of history, and he was a realist".[22]

In one respect, van Heijenoort and Trotsky were quite different; in another respect they were very much alike. Trotsky was a prolific writer whose *nom de guerre*, '*Pero*' ('the pen'), was well deserved. Van Heijenoort, despite his scholarship and urbanity, was not a prolific writer. He translated from Russian into French *The Correspondence of Leon and Natalia Trotsky, 1933—1938*, which he also edited. Beyond that, we have his 'Foreword' to *Trotsky's Diary in Exile, 1935*; his contributions to *Fourth International*, written in French and translated into English for the memorial volume, *Leon Trotsky: The Man and His Work*, including 'Lev Davidovich', 'How the Fourth International was Conceived', and 'On Some Critics of Trotsky'; and, of course, *With Trotsky in Exile*. 'Lev Davidovich' is a personal portrait of Trotsky during the years of exile in France, and describes Trotsky's work regimen. 'How the Fourth International was Conceived' is an historical-ideological discussion, from the Trotskyite standpoint, of Trotsky's attempts to create a new, non-Stalinist Communist Party.[23] 'On Some Critics of Trotsky' is a frankly partisan defense of Trotskyism against Stalinism and against wayward erstwhile American socialist allies (such as Max Eastman), whose revisionism is described as bourgeois opportunism — the same description which Lenin, and later Stalin, used in application to Trotsky himself.

In later years, van Heijenoort's expertise on Trotsky was also called upon — and not merely in his role as Special Bibliographer. In 1973, he served as an advisor to a group planning a movie about Trotsky. The film was never made, but van Heijenoort had the opportunity as a result to return backwards in time to 1932 with the film crew, visiting the villa in Prinkipo which remained, forty years after he had first left it, exactly as it had been on the day of his and Trotsky's departure, down to the very calendar on the dining room wall. For van Heijenoort, this experience was "spooky".

Van Heijenoort wrote his memoir, *With Trotsky in Exile*, with a clear sense of history, a sense which he shared with Trotsky, a sense which goes beyond presentation of biographical and autobiographical con-

sciousness, towards scholarship. evidenced by attention to the need to provide the 'Correction of Errors in Writings about Trotsky'.[24] Nevertheless, van Heijenoort wrote *With Trotsky in Exile* with a great sense of urgency. He wrote with haste, with a feeling that his memoir demanded to be completed quickly and that there was little time to say all that needed saying. This sense of haste pervades the book, and demands of the reader, as the author himself attests, considerable prior knowledge of the events about which van Heijenoort writes, or to which he frequently only alludes.[25] Van Heijenoort perhaps was thinking of the day when the Trotsky Archive would be officially opened to the public. More likely he felt a sense of impending doom. The memoir was written at a time when its author was troubled, pre-occupied with personal concerns and apparently afflicted with ill health.

Van Heijenoort was apparently both diffident and disdainful, and difficult to get to know on a personal level. He was shy, a bit nervous, always cautious, and intensely private.[26] These traits were no doubt learned — or re-enforced — during the ever-watchful years with Trotsky in exile. There was more than one attempt on Trotsky's life. Life in those years, remembered van Heijenoort, "was never simple, always hectic", and there developed among Trotsky and his closest circle a fortress mentality.[27] Van Heijenoort became a man of deep, but hidden, passion, passion which, on occasion, would erupt into bursts of anger that, even when quieted, would fester for years. (The incident of my review of *Exile* is a case in point.) Beyond the urbanity, there was a sensitivity which, once aroused, would never depart. This stood in sharp contrast to that reticence, born of defensive caution, that also had its roots in the same sensitivity. Van Heijenoort's reticence could frequently be displayed in a kind of exaggerated understatement, not far different from the exaggerated understatement to which Trotsky often resorted, although van Heijenoort's use was devoid of the sardonic humor — almost gallows humor — used by Trotsky in such circumstances.[28]

Like Trotsky, van Heijenoort was quick to recognize talent; but, also like Trotsky, he was sparing in his praise, and placed a lot of stress and tension on relations with those from whom he expected much. One is reminded of van Heijenoort's assertion about Trotsky, that "the more one worked with him, the more demanding and brusque he became".[29]

The same could with equal justification be said of van Heijenoort himself. Van Heijenoort would wince noticeably when his name was mispronounced (a not infrequent occurrence, especially with encounters with newly-met people, for him whom Trotsky referred to as a "young French comrade with a Dutch name"[30]); and he more than once would grow impatient with a question or a difference of academic opinion.

Van Heijenoort was not always so difficult. His mood could change abruptly. The very words which he used to describe his volatile relations with Trotsky could also be used to describe his relations with others: "I felt a constant modulation in them. There were periods of cheerful and warm confidence, followed by moments of surliness and tension."[31] Here, he was very much like Trotsky. Van Heijenoort could also be extremely sensitive, generous, and gracious at times.

Above all, van Heijenoort was extremely sensitive about his experiences with Trotsky. It is this author's opinion that *With Trotsky in Exile* was written at least in part as a psychic purgative, finally to put the Trotsky experience in the past, as much as it was an act of Sovietological scholarship; for van Heijenoort reacted with greater anger to the review of his memoir by this author. It caused him to break with the author, who, despite the best efforts of an intermediary, Judson C. Webb, a mutual friend, was never forgiven during van Heijenoort's lifetime.

With the death of Trotsky, van Heijenoort was led to reappraise his own life, and he found in mathematics the palliative which helped him to restore his shattered equilibrium.[32] In 1948, he formally broke his ties to Trotskyism. Thereafter, his association with Trotsky would be historical, as a scholar, rather than ideological. A year after his break with Trotskyism, in 1949, he earned his doctorate in mathematics from New York University. From then on, he lived a quiet, scholarly life teaching mathematics, and later logic and philosophy, at New York University, Columbia University, and, from 1965 to 1977, at Brandeis University. He became a specialist in mathematical logic and foundations of mathematics, history and philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mathematics, achieving an excellent international reputation in these fields.[33]

Van Heijenoort displayed an interest and facility with mathematics even while he was Trotsky's aide, and, soon after his arrival at Trotsky's

home in Prinkipo, he became involved in constructing a mathematical model of Russian economic growth for a book that Trotsky was planning on the Russian economic system. This work led to nought, however, since Trotsky set it aside and never used it. Van Heijenoort reported, therefore, that his impression was that Trotsky "mistrusted a mathematical argument that was not immediately transparent to him".[34] Was this healthy scepticism or obtuseness? Van Heijenoort did not say. The graphs of growth curves which van Heijenoort drew for Trotsky could have been done by any clever secondary-school student with a flair for mathematics. Van Heijenoort accomplished his results using a table of logarithms as his only tool. The "mathematical argument" required to justify the result is supplied in any secondary-school calculus course and involves nothing more complicated than taking the first derivative of a function at various values for the variable, or, to get the same results more quickly, using the "second derivative test".

There are two ways to treat mathematical reductionism if one does not have a sound mathematical knowledge. If one is of a 'humanist' bent, one may argue that the reduction of all reality to a simple mathematical formula — "2 times 2 equals 4", to take N. G. Chernyshevsky's example — is grossly inadequate, not to mention vulgar, even pernicious. If, on the other hand, one has pretensions to being a scientist — or materialist — of sorts but lacks sound mathematical knowledge, one may argue in favor of reduction of nature and all of life to a simple arithmetic equation such as "2 times 2 equals 4", instead of to the more sophisticated mathematical formulae, such as, say, differential equations, which physicists commonly employ to discuss their work. Van Heijenoort does not say into which category he thinks Trotsky fell, that of the 'humanist' or that of the overzealous but mathematically unsophisticated reductionist. He did say, elsewhere, however, where he thought that Trotsky's intellectual ancestors belonged.[35] Trotsky himself recalled that he was strong in his mathematics courses at the *Realschule* he had attended, and even thought of studying "higher mathematics".[36] The few scattered references to logic and dialectics in Trotsky's later notebooks suggest that Trotsky belongs to the 'humanist' school. For him, formal logic was merely the static fragment of dialectics, the logic of motion, standing in the same relation to dialectics as 'lower' mathematics stands to the 'higher' mathematics.[37]

As we turn our focus towards Trotsky's intellectual ancestors, we find that Vissarion Belinsky and Nikolai Chernyshevsky were among the first Russian philosophers to argue for the reduction of all of reality to the formula "2 times 2 equals 4". Indeed, Chernyshevsky attacked Lobachevsky and his hyperbolic non-Euclidean geometry for 'attacking' Euclid. But a mathematically sophisticated dialectical materialism sees in Lobachevsky's work a progressive tool in the struggle against idealism in mathematics.[38] In an unpublished paper on 'Friedrich Engels and Mathematics' written in 1948, the very year that marked his official break with Trotskyism, van Heijenoort showed that Engels did not understand non-Euclidean and n-dimensional geometries, but put them on the same level with spiritualism and other varieties of mysticism.[39] In this paper, van Heijenoort did not consider Trotsky's views on mathematics; but he did consider those of Marx and Engels. He compared Marx to a clever school-boy studying calculus and attempting to puzzle through, on his own, without benefit of proper mathematical training or guidance, some of the more difficult problems raised in the more fundamental concepts of the calculus. In his treatment, Engels is regarded even more sternly. Engels is seen as a mathematical boor and complete incompetent who had difficulty even with some of the basic ideas involved in elementary (pre-calculus) algebra. Some of the problems which Engels had with pre-calculus mathematics can be traced to his understanding of the philosophical precepts of dialectical materialism, said van Heijenoort.

It is sheer speculation to conclude, however, that the mathematical naiveté of Marx, the mathematical incompetence and ignorance of Engels, and (perhaps) the mathematical scepticism (or is it abstruseness?) of Trotsky, together with the underlying philosophical support structures that led Marx and Engels to do 'bad' philosophy of mathematics and worse mathematics, were responsible for van Heijenoort's break with Trotskyism, since van Heijenoort himself nowhere suggests explicitly the specific relevance of these considerations in his decision. We are entitled, on our own responsibility, to take these factors into consideration as we examine van Heijenoort's intellectual and scholarly ties to Trotskyism, and to justify our entitlement with reference to van Heijenoort's own statement that it was only in mathematics that he was

able to recover his equilibrium in the wake of the assassination of Trotsky and the events of the Stalin era.

In 1974, the author became van Heijenoort's student at Brandeis University and earned the Ph.D. in philosophy in 1977, with van Heijenoort heading his thesis committee. That same summer of 1977, just after the author received his degree, van Heijenoort became Professor Emeritus, but continued his studies in history of logic, and completed work on *With Trotsky in Exile*, working on the latter from his office in 207 Pusey, off Harvard Yard. The room in Pusey prominently displayed a photograph of van Heijenoort in sombrero and with bandoleros across both shoulders, with a Colt revolver strapped to his waist, a tangible reminder of his days with Trotsky in Coyoacan.

In August 1978, van Heijenoort and the author met again, during the course of an American Mathematical Society meeting held at Brown University in Providence, Rhode Island. The *Exile* book had just appeared in print, and I proposed to van Heijenoort that I review it for *Studies in Soviet Thought*. He appeared to greet the proposal with equanimity and nonchalance.

The idea for the review arose during the first part of 1978. As an assistant editor for the Retrospective Indexing Project of the *Philosopher's Index*. I was responsible for indexing back issues of *Studies in Soviet Thought* (as well as journals in logic and philosophy of science). The appearance of *Exile* at the time of the Providence meeting led me to inform van Heijenoort about my work on *Studies in Soviet Thought* for the *Index* and about my interest in reviewing *Exile* for *Studies*. That was on Thursday, 10 August, 1978. Van Heijenoort's reply, as I recall, was that that was my business. Early the next week, on 14 August, most likely, but possibly on 15 August, I met van Heijenoort on the steps of Harvard's Pusey Library, where van Heijenoort had his office, to discuss with him some of my current work in philosophy of logic. I again took the opportunity to tell him that I was planning also to review *Exile*, and once more he shrugged it off with an expression of insouciance. It was after this meeting, the last time I would ever again see him, that I crossed Harvard Yard and into the Harvard University Press Bookstore in the Holyoke Centre on the opposite side of Massachusetts Avenue to purchase a copy of *Exile*. And it was not until

the next day that I telephoned Thomas Blakeley with my proposal to review *Exile* for SST. My proposal was accepted immediately, with the one caution that I pay attention to philosophical-Sovietological concerns in my review. Work began for the review that same day, and in one-and-a-half to two weeks, a first draft was prepared, typed, and a copy sent to van Heijenoort.

Van Heijenoort's first reactions to the review are recorded in a letter of 5 September, 1978 (as quoted above).[40] Three days later, on 8 September, van Heijenoort wrote that he received the draft of the review, and added that "I certainly do not want to get involved with your review. It is your responsibility".[41] But he also noted that "there are two questions of fact that I cannot let pass".[42]

On page 5 of the typescript draft, I wrote that "If the Einsteinian theories are purely mathematical, or formal, then they can hold no threat to the diamat version of materialsim, van Heijenoort concludes".[43] In the 8 September letter, van Heijenoort wrote simply that "you have, apparently, not read my text very carefully". The reference is to p. 145 of *Exile*, where van Heijenoort wrote that

> In October [1939], Albert Einstein's name came up in a conversation between Trotsky and myself, in which Trotsky remarked, "He is essentially a mathematician." This, of course, was not correct, for Einstein's cast of mind was entirely that of a physicist. Whatever tools he needed, he took, already elaborated, from the works of the mathematicians. Trotsky's remark was an echo of the discussions that had taken place in Russia around 1922, when an attempt was made to show that Einstein's theories were in no way a threat to Marxist materialism, because they were somehow only mathematical fictions.

Now the fact, if fact it be — since it is unclear how van Heijenoort could have ascertained it — that Einstein's cast of mind was (entirely) that of a physicist, does not of itself *prima facie* exclude him from being a mathematician as well. For the history of mathematics provides numerous examples of mathematicians who were physicists and of physicists who were also mathematicians, in the sense that one is able to contribute to both fields; there is a sense in which physics, at least from the time of Newton forward, can be understood as applied mathematics. It happens that, in Einstein's case, the physicist borrowed the geometry of Riemann and Minkowski for use in formulating his theories of relativity and made no contributions to ('pure') mathematics

of his own. My remark that, if Einstein's theories are purely mathematical, then they do not threaten diamat, is clearly based upon the last sentence in the passage quoted from *Exile*, p. 145. Of course, Einstein was *not* a (pure) mathematician, although G. H. Hardy, the *purest* of the 'pure' mathematicians, considered Einstein to be a 'real' mathematician.[44] Einstein's physical theories were indeed fashioned as mathematical theories of physical systems, in exactly the same sense as Newtonian mechanics, as presented in Newton's *Principia*, is a mathematical theory of motion in physical space. But a mathematical theory of physical reality is one thing, the lived experience of physical existence is quite another. And the mathematical constructions do not, therefore, threaten the materialist analysis of concrete physical reality, do not threaten dialectical materialism. Quite the contrary.[45] Indeed, Engels argued that nature operates with mathematical formulae and mathematical entities "in exactly the same way and according to the same laws" as does the mathematician, though "the one is carried out by the human brain, while the other is unconsciously carried out by nature".[46] So by raising this as a problem, van Heijenoort is conflating mathematical theory of systems of physics with mathematical theory, just as he asserted that Engels had done, and just as, earlier, he himself had conflated dialectics with philosophy; he is in both cases treating the methodology of a theory with the theory itself.[47] Indeed, van Heijenoort himself wrote that Engels did not distinguish between laws of physics and equations of mathematics.[48] And this van Heijenoort saw as a fatal flaw. In fact, van Heijenoort saw Engels' erroneous conflation of mathematics and physics as essential to and embedded in his dialectical materialism. It arose, he wrote, in Engels' crude materialism and in his crude epistemological representationalism of the copy theory of knowledge. In both cases, the effect was to reduce formal abstractions to generalizations about external physical reality, and to equate conceptual structures and their formal and relational properties with physical existence. With this mechanism, Engels misses the hypothetical nature of mathematics and its logical structure, and so interprets the hypothetico-deductive procedures of mathematics as if they were and should be experiential investigations of material existence. It should be added that van Heijenoort had, at that time, in the late 1970s, expressed it as his own view that the objective conditions of life are not mathematically

grounded or determined, in the sense that life must be understood as a unique experience which cannot be defined by the rules of mathematical logic, but rather, which is conditioned by personal experience of objective social reality — or, if this is too dialectical an interpretation — that life is not a formal experience, but simply *life*.[49]

Van Heijenoort was admittedly correct, however, if his response to my remark was meant to show that my remark about the conclusion to be drawn about the meaning of Einstein's work for diamat, to be fully accurate, should have been expanded; but it is not clear from the passage cited that van Heijenoort was merely interpreting and explaining *Trotsky's* conclusion, or whether the conclusion was in accord with *van Heijenoort's own* thinking. In either case, there was a legitimate complaint that my remark required either additional qualification or some modification. And indeed, in the published version of my review, "van Heijenoort concludes" became "according to van Heijenoort's understanding of Trotsky's conclusion".[50] This alteration, in light of what I have discussed here, gives van Heijenoort, I think, the very large benefit of the doubt, even in spite of the levelling of similar complaints against Engels by van Heijenoort.

The second point which van Heijenoort raised in his letter of September 8 proved to be far more refractory — and volatile, leading to the break between van Heijenoort and the author. For although van Heijenoort called it a 'question of fact' in his letter, it is in fact a question of ideology and cuts to the core of the ideological differences between Trotsky and Stalin.

Van Heijenoort objected to my assertion that "he in fact seems to nearly equate" Trotskyism and Stalinism.[51] Van Heijenoort retorted that he "was very careful to use the metaphor of the 'soil' and the 'mushroom' in order not to give the idea of an identification".[52] The reference is to van Heijenoort's break with Trotsky, on the grounds that "the Marxist-Leninist ideas about the role of the proletariat and its political capacity seemed more and more to me to disagree with reality".[53] He went on to say that[54]

> this was also the time when the full extent of Stalin's universe of concentration camps became known .... Under the impact of this revelation, I began to reexamine the past, and I came to ask myself whether the Bolsheviks, by establishing an irreversible police rule and obliterating all public opinion, had not prepared the soil on which the huge and poisonous mushroom of Stalinism had grown.

Van Heijenoort's remarks about the Bolshevik establishment of police rule illustrate that van Heijenoort had little understanding of Russian history generally, and of the circumstances in particular surrounding the establishment of the Cheka.[55]

Van Heijenoort rejected the equation which I suggested that he had made between Trotskyism and Stalinism. In fact, I said no more than that he *seemed nearly to equate* these. I further qualified my claim by noting that this seeming near-identification was based upon his conclusion "that Bolshevism (Marxism-Leninism), in creating the dictatorship of the proletarian elite, was thereby the inevitable progenitor of Stalinism".[56] The concept of the *progenitor* which I introduced does not violate the model of the mushroom springing from the soil, precisely because there is an *organic* connection between the mushroom and the nurturing soil from which it springs. Indeed, Trotsky himself went to elaborate and great *pains* to show that Stalinism could not have arisen organically out of Leninism, for to admit that it had would have been to indict his whole past in Bolshevism, or, minimally, his role in the October Revolution and the Civil War. Van Heijenoort's use of the metaphor of the mushroom and the soil must have had its origins in Trotsky's metaphor of Stalinism as a "parasitic growth" on the tree of the October Revolution. In his book on *Their Morals and Ours*, Trotsky is forced to repudiate — or attempt to repudiate — the charge that there is no principled difference between Stalinism and Trotskyism; and yet in his book *Stalin*, he argues, apparently against the theory of parasitic growth, that the historical-materialist dialectics of the revolutionary situation in "backward" Russia made Stalinism "automatic", that is historically *inevitable*.

There are three alternatives, one of which must be certain: either Stalinism was a 'parasitic growth' on Marxism-Leninism (Bolshevism), or it was an organic part of Marxism-Leninism, or it is a phenomenon totally unrelated to Marxism-Leninism. Neither Trotsky nor van Heijenoort asserts the third alternative. Thus, Stalinism is, in their view, either an essential and "automatic" development of Marxism-Leninism — as Trotsky argued in *Stalin* — or it is an accidental or parasitic development, as van Heijenoort, according to his letter of 8 September, meant to imply by his metaphor of the soil and the mushroom, and as Trotsky asserted in *Their Morals and Ours*. But then Trotsky's claims are inconsistent. Let us grant the validity (for argument's sake) of

van Heijenoort's metaphor (and therefore of Trotsky's description of Stalinism as parasitic): in this case, we can assert that Stalinism is an accidental rather than an essential development of Bolshevism, but one which nevertheless is a natural organic feature of Bolshevism. Thus, we are entitled to interpret van Heijenoort's metaphor precisely in terms of Stalinism as a legitimate development of Bolshevism first of all; and, secondly, we may apply to this conclusion Trotsky's historical analysis of the dialectics of the objective conditions of Soviet Russia in the 1920s, on the basis of which Trotsky himself concluded that Stalin's rise and a Stalin dictatorship were automatic: "the dialectics of history have already hooked him [Stalin] and will raise him up. . . . If everything continues to go automatically, as it is going now, then Stalin will just as automatically become a dictator."[57] Now if Stalinism is an automatic and hence natural and dialectically necessary outgrowth of Marxism-Leninism in Soviet Russia, then we are clearly entitled to aver our interpretation that Stalinism is the historically inevitable and dialectically legitimized version of Marxism-Leninism (Bolshevism) under the objective historical reality within which it occurred and, as such, it is virtually identical with Bolshevism for its time and place. The question of the interpretation of van Heijenoort's metaphor aside, it is clear that van Heijenoort's statement, that he withdrew from participation in any form of Marxism-Leninism because it failed to agree with reality and because he concluded that Bolshevism had led to Stalinism, is alone sufficient to justify the assertion that he had, seemingly, nearly equated Trotskyism with Stalinism, since it was precisely the Trotskyite version of Bolshevism from which he withdrew on the grounds that Bolshevism had sown the seeds of Stalinism.

Let us note that "for years the liberals insistently explained Stalinism as the product of some original sin of Bolshevism, Lenin's quasi-diabolic invention. . . . Thus, to give rise to Stalinism, Bolshevism must contain a 'dictatorial quality' . . . ." These words are van Heijenoort's.[58] Clearly, the Trotskyite van Heijenoort rejected the thesis of the liberal bourgeoisie that Stalinism is contained in Bolshevism as a genetic flaw or that Stalinism is somehow inherent in, and thus somehow identical with, Bolshevism. The principal purpose of his essay 'On Some Critics of Trotsky' was specifically to refute emphatically the liberalist contention that Stalinism is contained in Bolshevism. The very heart of the

Trotsky-Stalin feud consisted, for Trotsky, in the absolute necessity to excise Stalinism from Bolshevism. In his soil and mushroom metaphor, van Heijenoort is himself now echoing and accepting the liberal thesis — or he is asserting it so as to accuse the author of the review of *Exile* of asserting it. But, in fact, all of the evidence, from the quotations of Trotsky and van Heijenoort to the objective evidence of historical reality through the emergence of Stalinism and the defeat of Trotskyism, shows that Stalinism is an historical stage of Bolshevism, and that Trotskyism has nothing to do with Bolshevism but belongs in the dustbin of history. Van Heijenoort and Trotsky echo the bourgeois liberal thesis to separate themselves from Stalinism. But they thereby separate themselves from Bolshevism while falsely claiming that Trotskyism is the sole legitimate heir of Bolshevism. It is hardly an accident that Trotsky confessed an admiration for bourgeois liberalism, in remarks to the bourgeois liberal philosopher John Dewey.[59]

I find it significant and instructive that van Heijenoort never explicitly raised the issue with me of a 'principled difference' between Trotskyism — what van Heijenoort apparently considered 'correctly orthodox' Bolshevism — and Stalinism. The question must then be whether, if Trotsky, rather than Stalin, had succeeded to the Bolshevik leadership after the death of Lenin, there would have been any significant difference in the *practice* of Bolshevism and the development of policy in the Soviet Union after Lenin's death. Would objective historical reality have materially or formally altered the Trotskyite doctrine of permanent revolution, or even have forced it to be discarded altogether? Clearly, Trotsky could not, as a Marxist, have accepted the reverse possibility, that, had he, rather than Stalin, attained the Bolshevik leadership, then he could have either materially or formally altered objective historical reality through his theory of permanent revolution. The fact is that, the dialectics of histomat aside, Trotsky's policies were those of a political outsider; and that it was Trotsky's theories which were out of consonance with objective historical reality after the Russian Civil War. And that is why Stalin, rather than Trotsky, succeeded to the Bolshevik leadership after Lenin's death. Precisely why. Van Heijenoort's arguments against the bourgeois liberal account of how Trotsky 'lost' power shows that objective historical reality clearly favored Stalin, not Trotsky.[60] One does not 'lose' that which one

never 'had' and never understood. As a matter of fact, in his *History of the Russian Revolution*, Trotsky *ignored* the question of whether Stalinism was not already rooted in the Red October. Trotsky's analysis of history was flawed, because his ideological assumptions were false; the theoretical requirement for a doctrine of permanent revolution rested upon the pessimistic presumption of the failure of a proletarian revolution and of the failure of socialism in one country; equally, it presumes the congenital and irreparable cultural, intellectual, and socio-economic inferiority of Russia, and hence the inherent falsity of Russian Communism. In fact, Trotsky was a petty-bourgeois careerist and adventurist. This alone accounts for the frequency of his many ideological and political shifts and reversals, none of which were dictated by the historical dialectics of objective historical reality. Moreover, the description of Trotsky in Lenin's 'Testament' suggests that Trotsky was too pedantic and dogmatically doctrinaire to adjust to the dialectics of the objective historical reality.[61] This view is too widespread among Trotsky's colleagues not to be given wide acceptance.[62]

From the standpoint of Party organization, Lenin defined Trotsky as an "opportunist" and a "Judas" whose policy was sheer adventurism, who "beats his breast and loudly professes loyalty to the Party".[63] A summary of the political and ideological complaints which Lenin levelled against Trotsky was given by Lenin himself: "Trotsky possesses no ideological definiteness."[64] To put the matter simply, as did the Bolshevik Party itself, Trotskyism "is *not* Bolshevism" at all.[65] Indeed, for true Bolsheviks, "Trotskyism is Marxism-Leninism's most sinister enemy, . . . , a false and venomous ideology."[66]

Finally, there is to be contended with Trotsky's own very powerful declaration that "Lenin created the apparatus. The apparatus created Stalin."[67] Many inferences may be drawn from this statement, and from each inference, many interpretations. Nevertheless, it is clear that Trotsky's analogy is far more forceful and direct than is van Heijenoort's mushroom and soil metaphor. Trotsky's assertion suggests an active, deliberate event, rather than an accidental, spontaneous, organic growth.[68] It also suggests a direct link between Lenin and Stalin, the link being the apparatus — the organization of the Bolshevik secretariat, more broadly, the organization of the Party and the organization of the State. This being the case, it is inescapable that, if Stalinism and

Bolshevism are not identical, then they are at the very least essentially equivalent and causally connected. Stalinism is a deliberate derivative of Bolshevism, then, and thus Stalinism is derivatively equivalent to Bolshevism. (On this score as well, Trotsky cannot evade responsibility. For he, too, had an active hand in, or at least quietly acquiesced to, the creation of the apparatus during the Red October and the Civil War.)

Let us grant that van Heijenoort would have rejected Trotsky's more blatant identification of Stalinism with Bolshevism through derivative equivalence. (And surely he must have known, in 1935, that Trotsky attributed the creation of Stalin to the Bolshevik apparatus.) Nevertheless, the identification of Stalinism and Bolshevism, and thus of Stalinism with Trotskyism (if Trotskyism is correctly orthodox Bolshevism, or simply Bolshevism), is inherent not only in Trotsky's analogy, but also in van Heijenoort's metaphor. Thus, Pomper is able to assert that Trotsky identified himself with Lenin.[69] By doing so, he identified himself correlatively with Bolshevism, we must add.

But of course Trotsky went to every length in his published writings to find ways to separate Leninism from Stalinism. But, curiously, his defense of Lenin took the form of a defense of the very behavior which, engaged in by Lenin and Trotsky, received, in his 'The Defense of Terrorism', Trotsky's moral approbation, but earned instead Trotsky's moral condemnation when engaged in by Stalin.[70] A curious defense, indeed. "Small wonder that several historians try to use this formula as proof that Stalinism was fully postulated in Lenin's methods . . .", as Trotsky himself wrote.[71] So like van Heijenoort, Trotsky rides the horns of a deadly dilemma: he must somehow try to distinguish Stalinism from Bolshevism while justifying Stalinist behavior in Lenin and himself and condemning that behavior in Stalin, if he is to carry his argument for his own Bolshevik legitimacy. Otherwise, he must separate himself from Bolshevism and thereby lose the very legitimacy which he wishes to claim for himself. But this is a distinction without a difference: "Lenin created the apparatus. The apparatus created Stalin."

From the standpoint of the legitimate Bolshevik, Trotsky's covetted identification of himself with Lenin and with orthodox Bolshevism is so much wind — "Trotsky behaves like a despicable careerist and factionalist"; he is a "scoundrel" and a "windbag".[72]

Let us, then, return to the question of the possibility of any practical

differences between a Trotskyite regime and the regime of Stalin. Although no issue is made of either the ethical or political characterizations and differences between Trotsky and Stalin in van Heijenoort's letters to the author or in *Exile*, we are free to suppose as we like that Trotsky would (or would not) have responded differently in practice if empowered than did Stalin under the same historical conditions. Our answer will be determined by our estimation of Trotsky's personality, whether we give the greater weight to Trotsky's *meščanstvo* (bourgeois mediocrity) or his *bezidejnost'* (lack of ideologicality), to his *bezpartijnost'* (lack of party-mindedness), or his being 'hooked', in spite of himself, by the dialectics of history and objective historical reality. As we have already noted, were Trotsky a true Marxist, then he would himself have to admit that he would act as an agent of objective historical reality, and that his actions would be determined by the historical conditions with which he was faced; he would be 'hooked' by the histomat dialectics, as was Stalin. Could there possibly be, then, any practical differences between a Trotskyite regime and a Stalinist regime? The answer, *slava Stalinu*, is patently evident.

The identification between Trotskyism and Stalinism which I suggested was inherent in van Heijenoort's metaphor, infuriated van Heijenoort and led directly to the break, initiated by van Heijenoort himself, between van Heijenoort and the author. And for good reason: the identification of Trotskyism with Stalinism is a direct and explicit negation of the position which Trotsky had staked out for himself historically, and to which van Heijenoort had committed himself from 1932 to 1948, in fact risking his life for this cause for the seven years from 1932 to 1939. Van Heijenoort's reaction, then, to my interpretation of his statement and the metaphor to which it was bound was not immediately evident in the letters of September 5 and 8 of 1978. And indeed, it was only later that I learned of the full depth of van Heijenoort's rage.[73]

My consideration of the apparent near-equation of Trotskyism with Stalinism was, of course, purely conditional, based upon implications and inferences which could be drawn, rightly or wrongly, from van Heijenoort's own explanation of his severance of all official ties to Trotskyism. I went on to suggest that, if this interpretation of van Heijenoort's assertions is correct, then "Trotskyism is either a Stalinist

chimera, or the differences between the politics of Trotsky and Stalin must have been immense, and so too the differences between Trotskyism and Bolshevism."[74]

Of course, as I noted, van Heijenoort would have been in a good position to point us towards the correct alternative; but he did not do so in *Exile*. I therefore supplied my own opinion, based upon the available historical record. Van Heijenoort was so blinded by the suggestion of the apparent near-equation of Trotskyism and Stalinism which I inferred from his own remarks that he failed to notice this conditional character, and he even supposed that I had asserted a factual precise identity. Nevertheless, my assertion was patently conditional. For when I chose between the alternatives that Trotskyism was either a Stalinist chimera or that Trotskyism and Stalinism, and hence Trotskyism and Bolshevism, were radically removed from one another, I chose the second alternative, reminding the reader of Trotsky's Menshevik leanings. Whatever the case, however, I pointed out that it does not follow that Bolshevism necessarily leads to Stalinism as "crowned socialism" — to use Trotsky's characterization.[75] My point here is just precisely that van Heijenoort's statement is misleading in either one of two respects: (1) the coupling of the mushroom and the soil metaphor with rejection of Marxism-Leninism because Stalinism grew out of the Bolshevism of Soviet Russia in the 1920s, leads directly and inescapably to the conclusion that, for Trotsky as a Bolshevik, Trotskyism is the identical twin of Stalinism; or (2) it suggests that Trotsky was an orthodox Bolshevik, even if we reject the linkage of Stalinism and Bolshevism, from which it follows ineluctably that, if a principled difference between Trotskyism and Stalinism exists, then van Heijenoort is at once rejecting a deep commitment which he had made and also seriously misreading my interpretation. The former probably accounts for his extreme sensitivity on this score, the latter for his extreme anger. And in either case, his attack was ideologically motivated, but unfounded. It certainly was not a matter of *fact*.

The correct question, then, is not whether Trotskyism is identical with Stalinism, but whether Trotskyism is even a variant of Bolshevism at all. The transition from the first question to the second was ignored by van Heijenoort in his response to my interpretation of his mushroom and soil metaphor. The doctrinal or ideological question focussed in the

second question is the *root* of the break between van Heijenoort and the author. I have already pointed to Trotsky's Menshevik leanings and sympathy. And so have nearly all other authors. I have also called upon the testimony, in these pages, of Lenin in witness of Trotsky's ideological disloyalty. If Trotsky has accused others of "trimming Marx's beard", then Trotsky has himself shorn it off altogether by his doctrine of permanent revolution. His own position was completely heterodox, not to say heretical, rejecting, as it did, in the theory of permanent revolution, the Marxist economic categories of feudalism, capitalism, and socialism, and the corollary Marxist analysis of categories of legal structure — autocracy, bourgeois republicanism, and proletarian dictatorship. It denies, in its internal logic, the possibility of attainment of Communism and social democracy. Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution thus rejected both Menshevism, which denied the existence of a nascent bourgeoisie in Tsarist Russia and sought to delay indefinitely the socialist revolution, and Bolshevism, which observed the development of a chronically weak but nevertheless well-entrenched bourgeoisie tied to the monarchy and which had been forcibly brought into a bourgeois revolution in February by the proletariat and was ripe for a socialist revolution in October of 1917. Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution was predicated on the assumption that the level of economic and governmental development of a society was irrelevant and that a single revolutionary act by the masses could lead directly from a pre-feudal stage to a classless society even beyond the rule of the proletariat. In short, the doctrine of permanent revolution rested upon an internally inconsistent, and hence unscientific, and certainly un-Marxist, set of assumptions.

It is arguable that Trotsky's position was always extremely fluid ideologically, rather than deliberately inconsistent. In either case, it deviated widely from the formulated analyses of objective historical reality put forward by Lenin and even more from the Stalinist analysis which led directly to Stalin's formulation of the principle of 'socialism in one country'. And of course, the competing doctrines of permanent revolution and socialism in one country were at the heart of the ideological — and political — struggle between Trotskyism and Stalinism. If van Heijenoort declared that the Marxist-Leninist analysis of the proletariat and its political role was divorced from objective historical

reality, we can reply that it was in fact Trotsky's analysis that was divorced from reality. What better proof of the correctness of the Stalinist analysis and the incorrectness of the Trotskyite analysis than the undeniable and obvious fact that Stalin held power and Trotsky 'lost' power. To this end, we may quote again Trotsky's own assertions about the "automatic" rise of Stalin and Stalinism, to refute both Trotsky and van Heijenoort, to whom that the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist assessement was in complete accord with objective historical reality. When van Heijenoort, therefore, writes that "Bolshevik ideology was, for me, in ruins", he is incorrectly associating Trotskyism with Bolshevism — or his apparently nearly equating Trotskyism with Stalinism (the Stalinist development of Bolshevism) — and simultaneously is admitting the inadequacy, if not the outright falsity, of Trotskyite ideology.[76]

These, then, are the full implications of van Heijenoort's metaphor of the mushroom and the soil. Whichever view one takes concerning van Heijenoort's statements surrounding his rejection of Bolshevism, his position is untenable on its own accord, and untenable also in light of the untenability of the Trotskyite heterodoxy. Under these circumstances, van Heijenoort's extreme umbrage with my interpretation of his mushroom and soil metaphor and the conditional equation of Trotskyism with Stalinism within the context of this interpretation, is entirely comprehensible and even quite natural. For it is a refutation of a significant segment of van Heijenoort's own past, a past about which he was, quite understandably, extremely sensitive, even without the intrusion of ideological issues.

The break between van Heijenoort and the author had its immediate cause directly in the author's having touched upon this doubly personal and ideological sore spot. The breach was initiated by van Heijenoort and was never bridged during van Heijenoort's lifetime, despite the best efforts and attempts of Webb and conciliatory gestures by the author. Thus, I learned only second-hand of van Heijenoort's activities after September of 1978. Thus, too, I learned second-hand and belatedly of his tragic death. Van Heijenoort was wont to say that "Life is tough". His own life was often adventurous, and seldom easy. He died at his home in Morales Province in Mexico, near Mexico City, on 28 March, 1986, murdered by his wife.[77] He was a proud and selfless warrior for his cause, however ill-chosen his cause may have been.

Thus, his long-time friend and colleague, the logician W. V. Quine, speaking at Harvard University at a memorial service for his friend, spoke of van Heijenoort as a "man of selfless devotion — to the revolution in his early years, as we know from his selfless memoir of his colorful years with Trotsky . . .".[78] He was, forever and in all things, precisely what Trotsky had nicknamed him, *Uže*, the 'narrow one' or 'already'.[79]

NOTES

[1] The author wishes to thank the Brandeis University Department of Philosophy and History of Ideas, which kindly supplied material from van Heijenoort's personnel file and photocopies of Boston-area newspaper clippings of stories relating to van Heijenoort's life and death.

[2] The brawl occurred at a mass meeting of the French Communist Party, held on 27 July, 1932, at the Bullier dance-hall on the Boulevard Saint-Michel in Paris. Van Heijenoort was clubbed during the melee and was rescued by his friends, getting away with a bloody head. Van Heijenoort blames the fight on the leader of the pro-Stalinist faction; the proximate cause provoking the combat was a dispute between Stalinists and Trotskyites on strategies for combatting German fascism. An account of this incident is given by van Heijenoort in his memoir, *With Trotsky in Exile: From Prinkipo to Coyoacan*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1978, pp. 2—3.

[3] Van Heijenoort, *With Trotsky in Exile*, pp. 151—160.

[4] Van Heijenoort, *With Trotsky in Exile*, p. v.

[5] I. H. Anellis, 'Review of van Heijenoort, *With Trotsky in Exile', Studies in Soviet Thought* **20** (1979), pp. 391—396.

[6] An English translation of collected documents of political and ideological issues showing that "Trotskyism is an anti-Marxist, opportunist trend . . ." is the Institute of Marxism-Leninism's *Against Trotskyism*, IML of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1972. The documents in this volume date from 1903 through 1927.

[7] Quoted by Marvin Pave, "His travels with Trotsky were always exciting", *Boston Globe*, January 6, 1980; and from p. 2 of 'Trotsky Files are Unveiled', *Boston Globe*, January 3, 1980, pp. 1—2.

[8] Quoted by Pave, *Boston Globe*, January 6, 1980.

[9] Anellis, Review of *Exile*, pp. 391—392, 393.

[10] Trotsky's 'Notebook on Hegel' was first published in Philip Pomper (editor and translator), *Trotsky's Notebooks, 1933—1935: Writings on Lenin, Dialectics, and Evolutionism*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 75—78; original Russian text, edited by Yuri Feltshinsky, in Pomper, pp. 117—120. The 'Notebook L[enin]', the so-called 'Second Notebook', and 'Additional Notes on Dialectics', also was first published in Pomper, pp. 79—107, 111—116; original Russian text, pp. 121—125.

The remark of Trotsky on his renewed philosophical interests is quoted from L. Trotsky, *Trotsky's Diary in Exile, 1935*, E. Zarudnaia, editor; 'Foreword' by Jean van

Heijenoort; Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1958, 1976, entry of 16 May, 1935, pp. 118—119. See also the editor's 'Introduction' of Pomper, in Pomper, *Trotsky's Notebooks*, p. 38, reporting on a conversation with van Heijenoort.

[11] Van Heijenoort, *Exile*, p. 75; Anellis, review of *Exile*, p. 395. In fact, van Heijenoort and Gabrielle Brausch, about whom this story was told, had one son, Jean, not twins. The story that the son Jean was twins was owing to a practical joke played on van Heijenoort, who at the time took the 'news' as fact and in that form passed it on to Trotsky.

[12] See in particular Trotsky's remarks in 'Additional Notes' in Pomper, *Trotsky's Notebooks*, pp. 113—116; Russian text, pp. 153—155. Of course Trotsky nowhere accepted the crude Lysenkoism according to which, if a living organism is mutated by non-genetic mutilation, its offspring would inherit the mutation (for example: that an animal whose tail had been amputated would produce tail-less offspring). My comment occurs on p. 395 of my review of *Exile*.

[13] Van Heijenoort, *Exile*, p. 74; Anellis, review of *Exile*, p. 393.

[14] Anellis, review of *Exile*, p. 393.

[15] J. van Heijenoort, Letter to Anellis, 5 September, 1978.

[16] The view of Trotsky as an intellectual tyrant is widespread in the literature, especially among opponents of Trotsky and Trotskyism. So also is the picture of Trotsky as arrogant, even nasty and obnoxious in his relations with others. Van Heijenoort himself helps to perpetuate this view. In *Exile*, p. 63, he wrote that "Trotsky had a side to him that was didactic, at times pedantic, one could almost say conservative. He looked askance at any innovation in the field of Marxist theory. He had an expression for such innovations: 'to trim Marx's beard'." And on p. 101 of *Exile*, van Heijenoort several times writes of Trotsky's self-confidence in his own ideas, and of his being "too lordly" to concern himself with details. On the personal side, van Heijenoort noted (*Exile*, p. 17) that "Trotsky's remarks about individuals were more often sarcastic"; he spoke of Trotsky (*Exile*, p. 26) as "demanding and brusque", given to "surliness" (p. 27); van Heijenoort even invokes a letter of 21 July, 1937 of Natalia Trotsky to her husband, in which she rebukes Trotsky for his pride (*Exile*, p. 113).

Van Heijenoort's unflattering portrayal of Trotsky as an intellectually arrogant tyrant also occurred in van Heijenoort's 'Lev Davidovich', in J. Hansen, *et al.*, *Leon Trotsky: The Man and His Work*, New York, Merit, 1969, pp. 44—46, reproduced from *Fourth International*, August 1941. We are told there (p. 45) that Trotsky's mood, "when it was a question of cudgeling an opponent ... swiftly changed into irony, biting and malicious, alternating with an expression of contempt and ... a hint of malevolence".

[17] J. van Heijenoort, 'On Some Critics of Trotsky', *Fourth International*, August 1942; reproduced in Hansen, *et al.*, pp. 52—56. The quotation is from p. 55.

[18] Quotations are from Pomper, *Trotsky's Notebooks*, p. 111; Russian text, p. 151, the 'Additional Notes on Dialectics and Darwinism'.

[19] Trotsky was at that time pre-occupied with what he considered the deviationism within the Trotskyite ranks in the United States, and he was by this time engaged in a bitter philosophical-ideological wrangle with Max Eastman on several fronts.

[20] As van Heijenoort had reported in *Exile*, pp. 83—94, some 900 documents from the years 1917 to 1922 which had been deposited in the International Institute for Social History in Amsterdam in 1935 were vulnerable. These documents were photographic and typewritten copies of letters whose originals were entrusted to the Politburo. On

October 10, 1935, a month-and-a-half before Trotsky contracted with the Institute for deposit of his papers (December 28, 1935), Trotsky wrote that "the G.P.U. will do everything possible to get hold of my archives" (quoted in *Exile*, p. 100). On the night of November 6, 1936, some of Trotsky's papers were indeed stolen from a Paris apartment (see *Exile*, p. 102), a theft attributed to the G.P.U. and a sometime associate of Trotsky's son Liova.

Trotsky was also involved in a messy legal wrangle with Liova's friend Jeanne Molinier over possession of papers that had been in Liova's hands at the time of his [Liova's] death. Trotsky, wrote van Heijenoort (*exile*, p. 120), "thought that Jeanne was playing with fire, because the French police were looking for a pretext to poke their noses into the papers, as was the G.P.U. too."

On 5 August, 1936, a gang of Norwegian Nazis entered the house in Wexhall, near Oslo, where Trotsky was staying, and stole correspondence and other documents (see *Exile*, p. 88). The 'Publisher's Preface' of Trotsky's *My Life* (New York, Grosset & Dunlap, 1930, 19—60) is mistaken when it calls this robbery attempt a failure (p. vii).

[21] See Pave, 'Trotsky Files are Unveiled', *Boston Globe*, January 3, 1980, pp. 1—2.

The ideological and historical documents at the Trotsky Archive at Harvard were actually open to the public from the outset. The personal material and correspondence remained unavailable until 1980. In 1980, van Heijenoort published the correspondence of Trotsky and his wife dating from 1933—1938, in J. van Heijenoort (editor and translator), *Correspondence of Leon and Natalia Trotsky*, 1933—1938, Paris, Gallimard, 1980.

[22] Quoted by Pave, *Boston Globe*, January 6, 1980.

[23] J. van Heijenoort, 'How the Fourth International was Conceived', *Fourth International*, August 1944; reproduced in Hansen, *et al.*, pp. 61—64.

[24] Van Heijenoort, *Exile*, pp. 151—160.

[25] Van Heijenoort, *Exile*, p. v.

[26] In his book on the exile years, van Heijenoort spoke of an affair between Trotsky and Frida Kahlo, wife of Mexican mural painter Diego Rivera, a socialist sympathizer and friend of Trotsky. Van Heijenoort treated this episode quite dispassionately, but described Frida herself as "a person remarkable for her beauty, character, and intelligence" (*Exile*, p. 110). But in his biography, *Frida: A Biography of Frida Kahlo* (New York, Harper & Row, 1983), Hayden Herrera hints at a liason between van Heijenoort and Kahlo; it is said there (p. 196) that "van Heijenoort . . . became an intimate friend of Frida's in 1937". Herrera's remarks are based upon personal interviews with van Heijenoort; their interpretation, however, is my own.

[27] Quoted by Pave, *Boston Globe*, January 6, 1980.

[28] An example of Trotsky's black humor is reported by van Heijenoort in *Exile*, p. 45. Speaking to the ill van Heijenoort on 25 May, 1933, waiting to be momentarily taken to hospital, Trotsky remarked: "Oh, you know, the hospital is not bad. It is almost as good as jail; one can read there in peace." The version given by Pave, *Boston Globe*, January 6, 1980, is slightly different: "Trotsky visited me there [in the hospital] and told me that the hospital was not so bad. In fact, it was almost as good as some of the jails he had been in."

[29] Van Heijenoort, *Exile*, p. 26.

[30] *Trotsky's Diary in Exile, 1935.*

[31] Van Heijenoort, *Exile*, p. 26.

[32] ". . . For several years the study of mathematics was all that allowed me to preserve my inner equilibrium"; van Heijenoort, *Exile*, p. 148.

[33] A full-scale authorized biography of van Heijenoort, begun prior to van Heijenoort's death, is being undertaken by Anita Feferman. A survey of van Heijenoort's technical work in mathematics, logic, and their history and philosophy is currently being prepared by me for the journal *History and Philosophy of Logic*, under the title 'Van Heijenoort, His Life and Contributions to Logic.'.

[34] Van Heijenoort, *Exile*, p. 34.

Or was it something else altogether — like a premonition? Joseph Hansen, one of Trotsky's bodyguards at Coyoacan, reported (J. Hansen, 'With Trotsky to the End', in J. Hansen, *et al.*, pp. 16—24) that Trotsky, speaking of the assailant whose blow would prove fatal for Trotsky, had told Hansen that "We talked about French statistics" moments before the deadly blow was delivered (p. 17). Natalia Sedova Trotsky reported ('How It Happened', pp. 35—39, in Hansen, *et al.*) that on his death-bed in the Mexican hospital, Trotsky told Hansen that he wanted Hansen "to make a note about French statistics".

[35] J. van Heijenoort, 'Friedrich Engels and Mathematics,' written in 1948, posthumously published in J. van Heijenoort, *Selected Essays*, Naples, Bibliopolis — Edizioni di Filosofia e Scienze, 1986; copyright 1985, pp. 123—151.

[36] Trotsky, *My Life*, p. 50.

[37] See, for example, Pomper, *Trotsky's Notebooks*: "*Meždu tem dialektika otnositsja k logike (formal'noi), kak vyssaja matematika k nizšei*", (p. 117); "*Sillogizm bezuslovno pravilen tol'ko togda on — tavtologija, t.e. kogda on besploden. Sillogizm 'polezen' togda, kogda on . . . ne pravilen, t.e. kogda on dopustimych razmerach 'zazor'. . . . Zdes' i načinaetsja dialektika.*" (p. 150); "*Dialektika est' logika razvitija. Logika (formal'naja) est' dialektika nepodvižnosti*'" (p. 151).

[38] For the views of Belinsky, see V. G. Belinskii, '*Vybranye mesta iz perepiski druz'jami Nikolaja Gogolja*,' in V. G. Belinskii, *Polnoe Sobranie Sočinenii* 13 tme., M., 1953—1959, tm. X, str. 64. For the views of Chernyshevsky, see N. G. Černyševskii, '*Kritika filosofskich predubeždenii protiv obščinnogo vladenija*', in his *Sobranie Sočinenii*, 5 tme., M., 1974, tm. IV, str. 370. William F. Woehrlin, *Chernyshevskii: The Man and the Journalist* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 334, quotes the letter in which Chernyshevsky attacks Lobachevsky for attacking Euclid.

The more current and mathematically sophisticated attitude of dialectical-materialist philosophers of mathematics can be found in such writings of Sof'ija Aleksandrovna Janovskaja as *Peredovye idei N. I. Lobačevskogo — orudie bor'by protiv idealizma v matematike* (M. & L., 1950), 84pp., and '*O mirovozzrenii N. I. Lobačevskogo*', *Istoriko-matematičeskie issledovanija* **3** (1950), pp. 30—75; **4** (1951), pp. 173—200.

For Marx' work on differential calculus, see S. A. Janovskaja (editor), K. Marks, *Matematiceskie Rukopisi* (M., 1968), with Janovskaja's editor's preface. A partial English translation of this work, Karl Marx, *Mathematical Manuscripts* (London, New Park Publications, 1983) is available but leaves much to be desired in its quality.

[39] See Note 35.

[40] See Note 15.

[41] J. van Heijenoort, 'Letter to Anellis', 8 September, 1978.

[42] *Loc. cit.*

[43] The first draft of my review is no longer extant — unless a copy exists, still,

somewhere among van Heijenoort's papers. I destroyed all of my copies of the first draft after preparing the final version, which was the version published. In view of van Heijenoort's violent reaction to the review, which I shall recount momentarily, it is doubtful that he retained a copy of either the first draft or a reprint of the final, published version, although, admittedly, I cannot say with certainty. The quotation just cited is as was given in van Heijenoort's letter, in which he quoted from his copy of the first draft.

[44] See G. H. Hardy, *A Mathematician's Apology*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1940; with a 'Foreword' by C. P. Snow, 1967, p. 131.

[45] See I. H. Anellis, 'Science and Diamat', *Studies in Soviet Thought* **25** (1983), 11–22.

[46] F. Engels, '*Über die Urbilder des mathematischen "Unendlichen" in der wirklichen Welt*', in F. Engels, *Sonderausgabe*, M. & L., 1935, pp. 466, 467 respectively; quoted in van Heijenoort, 'Friedrich Engels and Mathematics' pp. 137, 136 respectively.

[47] See Notes 15, 18.

[48] Van Heijenoort, 'Friedrich Engels and Mathematics'.

[49] "Life is not first-order; life is not second-order: Life is life", said van Heijenoort (referring to the characterization of systems of formal, i.e. mathematical, logic as first- and higher-order theories of quantification, and asserting that lived experience is not governed, or defined, by mathematico-logical formulas). Spoken May 7, 1975; quoted in I. H. Anellis, *Ontological Commitment in Ideal Languages* (Ph.D. Thesis, 1977), p. 342.

[50] Anellis, review of *Exile*, p. 394.

[51] Anellis, review of *Exile*, p. 392; p. 2 of the draft.

[52] 'Van Heijenoort to Anellis', 8 September, 1978.

[53] Van Heijenoort, *Exile*, p. 149.

[54] *Loc. cit.*

[55] See Lennard D. Gerson, *The Secret Police in Lenin's Russia*, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1976, and especially I. H. Anellis, review of Gerson, *Studies in Soviet Thought* **23** (1982), pp. 168–170.

[56] Anellis, review of *Exile*, p. 392.

[57] L. D. Trotsky, *Stalin*, London, 1947, New York, 1970, p. 393.

[58] Van Heijenoort, 'On Some Critics of Trotsky', p. 53 of Hansen, *et al.*

[59] See van Heijenoort, *Exile*, p. 110; Said Dewey: "'If all Marxists were like you, Mr. Trotsky, I would be a Marxist', said Dewey. Whereupon Trotsky retorted, 'If all liberals were like you, Mr. Dewey, I would be a liberal'."

[60] Van Heijenoort's motivating question in 'On Some Critics of Trotsky' was a defense against the bourgeois liberal explanation of how Trotsky 'lost' power. Of course one does not 'lose' that which one never 'had'.

[61] V. I. Lenin, 'Lenin's "Testament"', pp. 149–150 in Robert V. Daniels (editor), *A Documentary History of Communism, Vol. I. Communism in Russia*, London, I. B. Tauris & Co., Ltd., 1985.

[62] Besides Lenin's, there are similar views expressed, for example, by G. A. Ziv, *Charakteristike po Ličnym Vospominanym*, New York, 1921, and by A. V. Lunacharsky, *Revolutionary Silhoutettes* London, 1967, as well, as I have noted (see Note 16), by van Heijenoort himself. Even one such as Bertrand Russell, with no interest whatever in the inside considerations of Bolshevism — who met Lenin, Trotsky, and Gorky during a

visit to the USSR in 1920 — formed a negative impression of Trotsky's character and compared him to Napoleon. Bonapartism, of course, is a serious charge amongst true Marxists; and Russell was unwilling to vouch for the strength of Trotsky's Communist conviction (see B. Russell, *The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1920; 1948; 1962, p. 30).

[63] Lenin, 'Judas Trotsky's Blush of Shame' (1911), in IML, *Against Trotskyism*, pp. 70—71. The reference 'Judas' is to the central character of M. E. Saltykov-Shchedrin's novel *Gospoda Golovëvy* (The Golovyov Family), a venal, congenital hypocrite.

[64] Lenin, 'Disruption of Unity under Cover of Outcries for Unity' (1914), in IML, *Against Trotskyism*, p. 88.

[65] 'Resolution "On Comrade Trotsky's Actions", Plenary Meeting of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik), Moscow, 17—20 January, 1925,' in IML, *Against Trotskyism*, p. 246. The main points of contention raised were Trotsky's views on the New Economic Policy (NEP), his insistence on the pseudo-Marxist dogma of permanent revolution, his factionalism, and his opposition to Leninist centralism in the Party. These are exactly the same complaints which Lenin himself (with the exception of the question of the NEP) levelled against Trotsky since 1903.

[66] IML, *Against Trotskyism*, 'Foreword', p. 9.

[67] "*Lenin sozdal apparat. Apparat sozdal Stalina*", Pomper, *Trotsky's Notebooks*, 'Notebook on Lenin', p. 86; russian text, p. 129.

[68] *Sozdavat'* is an active verb, suggesting active, or motive, i.e. moving, cause, *Sozdatel'* is a creator or builder, a moving cause. If Trotsky had intended a passivity in the emergence or appearance of Stalin, he might have chose *stroit'*, a neutral, hence passive, verb.

[69] Pomper, editor's introductory essay, 'Lenin and Revolutionary Politics', in Pomper, *Trotsky's Notebooks*, p. 18.

[70] See, for example, Pomper, 'Lenin and Revolutionary Politics', especially pp. 27—28, 30—32. See also Trotsky's own work on 'The Defense of Terrorism: A Reply to Karl Kautsky', London, Labour Publishers, 1921.

[71] L. D. Trotsky, 'Režim Stalina, Partija', (Trotsky Archives, T4759), p. 8; quoted by Pomper, p. 32.

[72] Quotations are, respectively, from Lenin, 'Letter to Zinoviev' of 24 August, 1909, in IML, *Against Trotskyism*, p. 37, *ibid.*; Lenin, 'Social-Democracy and the Provisional Revolutionary Government' (1905), in IML, *Against Trotskyism*, p. 29.

[73] After receipt of the letter of September 8, I no longer heard from van Heijenoort. I had at first just assumed that this was owing to the frequency of his travels. (Van Heijenoort frequently travelled between his homes in Paris, Mexico — in Morales Province near Mexico City, and Cambridge, Massachusetts, and he was also a fairly regular visitor on Long Island, New York.) For my part, I felt fully justified in publishing my review of *Exile* in *Studies in Soviet Thought*, since van Heijenoort had been given the opportunity to comment upon the first draft and I had taken into account his express concerns when preparing the final version, the version which saw publication. I later came, slowly, to conclude that I had not fully appreciated, at the time, van Heijenoort's sensitivity concerning the issue of Stalinism *versus* Trotskyism and the impact which the experiences with Trotsky had had upon van Heijenoort's sensibilities and psyche. I first became aware of van Heijenoort's anger a year and a half after the last exchange of letters of September 1978, when I telephoned van Heijenoort;

uncertain that he recognized my voice, I identified myself several times and mentioned that I had not heard from him for a long time. After an awkward pause, he replied: "You are intellectually dishonest, and I don't want to talk to you anymore!"; whereupon he slammed down the receiver. I was stunned, flabbergasted, and it was then that I came to conclude, slowly, that I had not at first understood how sensitive the Trotsky issue was — and remained — for him.

In the years since, Judson Webb, a mutual friend, made efforts to reconcile us, but to no avail, alas. Webb reported to me that, whenever he mentioned my name to van Heijenoort, van Heijenoort would maintain a sullen silence and display no other reaction. Eventually, Webb told me that van Heijenoort was angry with me precisely because of my statement in the review about Stalinism. It is not altogether clear, from the chronology of events, or perhaps even despite that chronology, whether van Heijenoort's anger arose because of the *černovik* of my review, or the published review, or, perhaps, both together. However, from evidence only recently obtained from Webb, it is fair to conclude that it was the *černovik* which initiated van Heijenoort's hostile reactions.

It was only after van Heijenoort's death that I learned, in the course of a telephone conversation which I had with Webb on September 10, 1986 (that is, exactly eight years to the day from my receipt of van Heijenoort's letter of September 8, 1978), the full extent of van Heijenoort's wrath. Webb told me that van Heijenoort had simply exploded with rage over my interpretation of his comments as a near-equation of Stalinism and Trotskyism. Indeed, Webb's description of van Heijenoort's reactions echoes Max Eastman's description of Trotsky's reactions to Eastman's observations about dialectics: "Trotsky, especially in our heated arguments . . . , in which he becomes excited and wrathful to the point of losing his breath, seems to me at times almost weak. He seems too small for the struggle. He cannot laugh at my attacks on his philosophy, or be curious about them . . . , because in that field he is not secure. He is not strongly based. . . . Yesterday he reached a point of tension in our argument . . . that was extreme. Trotsky's throat was throbbing and his face was red; he was in a rage." (M. Eastman, *Einstein, Trotsky, Hemingway, Freud, and Other Great Companions*, New York, Collier, 1962, p. 113). More, Webb intimated to me that van Heijenoort's anger remained unabated over those years, each time Webb raised the issue with him. Indeed, after van Heijenoort's death, the question was raised (in light of the circumstances of his death) by his biographer Anita Feferman — and surely by the Mexican police during their investigation of his death — whether van Heijenoort had ever exhibited a violent temper: Webb informed me that his answer to this question by Feferman was affirmative, and that the prime example, in fact the only example which he could offer to Feferman in the course of his interview with her shortly after van Heijenoort's death, was in regards the incident of my review of *Exile*. Needless to say, a reconciliation never occurred, despite my efforts and those of Webb.

Excursus: Surprisingly and disappointingly, I have not (yet) been contacted by Feferman and offered an opportunity to present my side of this story — which is a partial motivation for my interest in publishing the present account — or to recollect for the Feferman biography of van Heijenoort happier experiences of my years as van Heijenoort's student.

[74] Anellis, review of *Exile*, p. 392.

[75] *Loc. cit.*

[76] Citation from van Heijenoort, *Exile*, p. 149.

[77] I learned of van Heijenoort's death on September 2, 1986, from a notice in the *Journal of Symbolic Logic* **51** (1986), p. 864. I did not successfully reach Judson Webb by telephone until September 10.

According to Webb, there were no outward signs of trouble between van Heijenoort and his wife before the murder took place. Van Heijenoort had been in Boston and Cambridge (Massachusetts) and had seen Webb there. Van Heijenoort and his wife had also been on a visit to France and gave Webb the impression that they had enjoyed their trip. They returned home to Mexico together, and then van Heijenoort continued on alone to Stanford, California, where he was preparing an anthology of his technical papers in history and philosophy of logic (*Selected Essays*) for publication and was working on a major project of editing and preparing for publication the collected works of the logician Kurt Gödel. Shortly after his [van Heijenoort's] arrival at Stanford, said Webb, van Heijenoort received a plaintive telephone call from his apparently distraught wife, in which she asked him to return home; and indeed, he returned to Mexico forthwith. There may have been an argument between van Heijenoort and his wife during that telephone conversation, inasmuch as van Heijenoort wished to remain at his work in Stanford. There may also have ensued an argument upon van Heijenoort's arrival in Mexico, perhaps a continuation of the earlier argument. For there, according to Mexican police reports (as transmitted to me by Webb), van Heijenoort was shot in the head by his wife, not long after his arrival home. Turning the weapon away from van Heijenoort, his wife also shot herself in the head. Mexican police were unable to determine any motive for the murder-suicide but surmised that a violent argument ensued between van Heijenoort and his wife. I speculate — and this is sheer speculation — that the murder-suicide was provoked by jealousy triggered either by publication of Herrera's biography of Frida Kahlo, which could have aroused suspicion of an affair between Kahlo and van Heijenoort, or by research (and in particular personal interviews) by Anita Feferman for her biography of van Heijenoort. Van Heijenoort had had four wives (the last — the fourth — his murderess, had also been his second) and several mistresses besides Gabrielle Brausch: enough reasons for any jealousies.

There is some disagreement even concerning the exact date of van Heijenoort's death. The *Journal of Symbolic Logic* (51 (1986); p. 864; 'In Memoriam Jean van Heijenoort'), the Association for Symbolic Logic *Newsletter* (September 1986; 'In Memoriam Jean van Heijenoort'), the *Boston Globe* for April 13, 1986 (P. Currier, 'Obituaries: Jean van Heijenoort, former aide to Trotsky, Professor at Brandeis'), and the *Middlesex News* for April 18, 1986 (p. 4B; 'Jean van Heijenoort, was professor at Brandeis, bodyguard of Trotsky'), all give the date as March 28; Beverly Woodward, who organized the memorial service for van Heijenoort on April 28 at Harvard University ('Memorial Service — Jean van Heijenoort'; mimeo, 1986), and the Brandeis University *Justice* for April 23, 1986 ('Jean van Heijenoort dies') give the date as March 25. I have not been able to confirm either date, and have not obtained access to Mexican newspapers or other documents that might settle this question. In lieu of confirming evidence, I take the *Boston Globe* — a respected newspaper — as authoritative.

Note added in proof. From a very recent conversation with Professor Alejandro Garciadiego of Mexico City, I learned that reports of the Mexican police accounts of the murder-suicide given in the Mexican newspapers are substantially the same as Webb's description of the police accounts. Professor Garciadiego did not, however, recall which date these papers gave as the day of van Heijenoort's death.

[78] W. V. Quine, 'Remarks at the Harvard University memorial service for Jean van Heijenoort, April 28, 1986'. Professor Quine kindly sent me a typed transcript of his remarks, with permission to use it as I pleased. A special thanks, are due, then to Professor Quine.

[79] See van Heijenoort, *Exile*, p. 17. *Uže* may be defined as 'already' or 'no longer'; it is also the intermediate degree of the comparative adjective '*uzkii*' ('narrow' or 'tight'). The correct translation depends upon whether the stress is placed on the final or the first syllable. Trotsky gave it as 'Already' in order to honor van Heijenoort with same nickname that Lenin was supposed to have bestowed upon Sverdlov.

110 McDonald Drive, # 8-B,
Ames, IA 50010—3470,
U.S.A.

IRVING H. ANELLIS